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PLACE AND CRIME
TRACEY L. MEARES*

Although this is a symposium dedicated to the discussion of race
and crime, I don't really want to talk about race and crime-at least
not directly. I want to talk about crime in places-inner city communities. It is through the lens of place that the question of race and
crime, as well as class and crime, is better understood.' My discussion
of place and crime will take on the connection between race and crime
in a very nuanced fashion. Specifically, I will lay out a theory that
engages the connections between law and the social sciences. The theory I will explore here helps to explain both the disproportionate
numbers of both minority offenders processed by the criminal justice
system and minority victims counted by it. The theory does more: it
explains why the arguments that both promote and attack current visions of law enforcement are hampered by a myopic focus on individual law breakers that condemns both sides to ineffectiveness.
The relevant theory is a sociological conception of crime first advanced over fifty years ago. In 1942, Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay, two researchers from the Chicago School of sociology, argued in
a seminal work that the structure of communities matters more in explaining the occurrence of delinquency than do the individual characteristics of offenders. 2 According to Shaw and McKay's social
organization theory, individual factors often connected with crimesuch as low economic status or unemployment-do not themselves
significantly impact crime. Rather, community-level structures-such
as the prevalence of friendship networks, participation by community
residents in formal organizations like PTAs and churches, and community-wide supervision of neighborhood teen peer groups-mediate
* Assistant Professor, University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful to Emily Buss,
Dan Kahan, Randall Kennedy, and Richard McAdams for comments on an earlier draft. The
Russell Baker Scholars Fund provided financial assistance.
1. It should become clear shortly that even the notion of place and crime is somewhat too
reductionist. The community-centered theory that I will advance here looks to a geographical
notion of community, which is obviously concerned with place, but the theory also looks to the
communities that individuals can create and maintain through social networks. Because these
networks sometimes exceed neighborhood boundaries, even the concept of place and crime can
be too limiting.

2. See CLIFFORD R. SHAw & HENRY D. McKAY, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND URBAN

AREAS (rev. ed. 1969); infra text accompanying notes 6-9.
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the impact of these factors on crime. Put another way, the structure of
the community in which an individual lives interacts in important ways
to either facilitate or retard that individual's criminal or delinquent
behavior. Because they promoted the connection between community level structures and crime over the relevance of individual dispositions to offend, Shaw and McKay doubted the efficacy of deterrence

models driven by formal state-imposed sanctions.
Shaw and McKay's skepticism of formal deterrence models motivates my critique of the current approach to law enforcement. The
current "law and order ' 3 approach to crime control often adopted by
politicians seeking to curry public favor relies heavily on increasing
the severity and prevalence of formal sanctions for criminal offending.
Mandatory minimum prison sentences for retailing very small
amounts of drugs and so-called "three strikes" laws are two examples.
Law and Order Cheerleaders claim that the incentives of individual
law breakers to engage in criminal conduct can be shaped by raising
the probability and severity of state-imposed sanctions. In contrast,
the social organization explanation of crime emphasizes the importance of social control through the generation, promulgation, and
transmission of effective community norms among individuals who
live together and interact with each other.4 The major problem with
the Cheerleaders' approach is that they typically prescribe policies
that too often end up destroying the very foundations of community
conduits that can promote crime-fighting goals through the private enforcement of norms.

3. This term is, of course, a simplification. The views of this group fall along a spectrum
that includes Massachusetts governor William Weld, whose comments regarding crime control
suggest a completely punitive bent, see J.W. Mason, The gulag society, IN THESE TiaES, Aug. 19,
1996, at 34 (quoting William Weld: "prison should be like a tour through the circles of hell"),
and John Dilulio, who has argued in favor of longer prison sentences to address the expected
crime wave to be caused by a coming generation of "super predators" as a way to improve norms
of civility. See WILLIAM J. BENNETr ET AL., BODY COUNT: MORAL POVERTY... AND How TO
WIN AMERICA'S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS (1996). As will become clear, the social

organization approach that I advocate here shares Dilulio's concern with shaping of norms; however, I disagree with his reliance on the use of prison sentences to effectuate the goal. Thus, I
use the term "Law and Order Cheerleaders" to emphasize the fact that those who support this
approach believe that there is a very close connection between law enforcement policy that
emphasizes formal state sanctions and crime reduction.
4. In this way, the social organization model of crime connects up with an emerging body
of work that emphasizes the importance of investigating the interrelationship between law and
norms and, more specifically, the potential for law to regulate behavior indirectly by manipulating the norms that constrain (or enhance) human action. Lawrence Lessig has referred to this
work as the "New Chicago School." See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEG.
STUD. (forthcoming June 1998).
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Law Enforcement Skeptics 5 attack the Cheerleaders' approach to
criminal law policy. Many Skeptics maintain that the continuing problematic existence of racial discrimination in the administration of law
enforcement undermines the legitimacy of the massive levels of imprisonment prescribed by the Cheerleaders. Skeptics also highlight
the negative consequences that flow from the disproportionate involvement of people of color in the criminal justice system. As a remedy, some Skeptics have proposed policies that emphasize racial
redistribution of law enforcement outcomes. Social organization theory reveals the Skeptics' approach to be misguided, however, because
racial redistribution of law enforcement outcomes can be an unfortunately limited remedy to the problems that the Skeptics perceive.
Like Cheerleaders, Skeptics make formal state sanctions central to
their argument to the exclusion of the importance of private norms.
In addition, Skeptics fail to see that minority and non-minority offenders are rarely similarly situated once the community context that produces offenders is considered. By too quickly prescribing programs
that rely on extending less law enforcement to places that desperately
need it to enhance the ability of inner city communities to exert social
control over neighborhood residents, the Skeptics' approach undermines crime fighting goals in inner city communities.
To sum up, current criminal law policy has had extremely detrimental effects on the residents of poor inner city communities, many
of whom are people of color. Too many of the residents of these communities are offenders, and too many are victims. The solution offered by proponents of the current criminal law enforcement regime is
more law and order. Their opponents disagree with the proponents'
heavy reliance on prison sentences, and they advocate withdrawal of
law enforcement from racial minorities as a group. Both sides make a
similar mistake: each spends too much energy and time focusing on
arguments that address law breakers directly. Neither side constructively engages the needs of law abiders by taking on the project of
reinforcing norms of law abidingness in the inner city. Thinking about
place and crime can address the negative consequences produced by
the excesses of both sides of this important debate.
5. This term, too, is a simplification meant to distinguish those who advocate greater

equality in the distribution of "negative law enforcement" between minorities and non-minorities from those who are Law and Order Cheerleaders. By negative law enforcement I mean the
discretion of law enforcement agents to underenforce or to refrain from enforcing the law. Thus,
positive law enforcement would refer to the decision of law enforcement agents to pursue criminal sanction through arrest, prosecution, etc.
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The rest of this essay comes in four parts. The next part briefly
lays out the connection between social organization theory and the
often-noted conundrum of race and crime. The hypothesis of the theory is straightforward: when structures of community social organization are prevalent and strong, crime and delinquency should be less
prevalent, but when community structures are weak there will be
more crime and delinquency. This hypothesis is very relevant to the
race and crime inquiry. Residential segregation by race and class, historically supported by state action, ensures that many of the structurally weakest inner city communities are also overwhelmingly minority.
Parts II and III evaluate two prominent and opposing approaches to
law enforcement policy. The first approach to law enforcement policy
emphasizes the importance of deterring crime in inner city communities through the application of formal state sanctions. The second approach emphasizes the removal of these same sanctions from minority
groups with a goal of equality in the exposure of both minorities and
non-minorities to law enforcement outcomes. Parts II and III explain
how the social organization view of crime can illuminate the flaws in
both of these approaches. The last section of this essay argues that
law enforcement is critical to the social organization improvement
project-but not law enforcement as usual. What is necessary is a
new direction for law enforcement policy that is attendant to the connection between place and crime while addressing some of vexing issues of race and crime.

I.

THE THEORY

Several decades ago, Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay demonstrated that high rates of juvenile delinquency were specific to geographical location and, moreover, that these high rates persisted in the
same areas over many years regardless of population turnover. Shaw
and McKay concluded that if crime stayed relatively stable even when
those who offended changed substantially, then there had to be something about the communities in which the individuals lived, as opposed to the individuals themselves, that ignited crime. The
researchers looked to factors such as community-level rates of poverty, the ethnic heterogeneity of communities, and the levels of6 residential mobility to explain variations in crime and delinquency.
After being virtually ignored for almost two decades, this theory
has recently enjoyed renewed prominence. Modem proponents of
6. See SHAW & McKAY, supra note 2.
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Shaw and McKay's theory define social organization as the extent to
which residents of a neighborhood are able to maintain effective social
control and realize their common values. 7 These scholars look to fac-

tors such as family disruption, urbanization, and unemployment, in
addition to low economic status, ethnic heterogeneity, and residential

8
mobility, in order to predict the breakdown of social organization.
There are three important dimensions of neighborhood social organization often discussed in the literature: (1) the prevalence, strength,

and interdependence of social networks; (2) the extent of collective
supervision that the residents exercise and the personal responsibility
they assume in addressing neighborhood problems; and (3) the level
of resident participation in formal and informal organization such as
churches, block clubs, and PTAs. 9 The idea is that community-level
social processes such as the level of supervision of teenage peer
groups, the prevalence of friendship networks, and the level of residential participation in formal organizations, mediate the link often
noted between individual-level factors, such as race and socioeco-

nomic status, and crime.
It should be obvious, then, that the conditions that characterize

poor, minority, inner city communities fit into the social organization
model of crime. In urban areas, many poor people of color live in
conditions of concentrated poverty and unemployment that predict
the breakdown of community social processes, which in turn produce
crime. Unlike other poor Americans, African Americans who are
poor often live in poor communities. 10 The overwhelmingly poor

communities in which many poor African Americans live are marked
7. I rely on the definition advanced by Professors Robert Sampson and William Julius
Wilson. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW
URBAN POOR 20 (1996); Robert J. Sampson & W. Byron Groves, Community Structure and
Crime: Testing Social-DisorganizationTheory, 94 AM. J. Soc. 774, 777-82 (1989); William Julius
Wilson, The 1994 Nora and Edward Ryerson Lecture, Crisis and Challenge: Race and the New
Urban Poverty, U. CHI. REC., Dec. 8, 1994, at 2.
8. See Robert J. Sampson & William Julius Wilson, Toward a Theory of Race, Crime, and
Urban Inequality, in CRIME AND INEQUALIrY 37, 45-48 (John Hagan & Ruth D. Peterson eds.,
1995); see also Robert J. Sampson, Urban Black Violence: The Effect of Male Joblessness and
Family Disruption, 93 Am. J. Soc. 348 (1987) (discussing the effect of family disruption on crime
independent of joblessness and welfare receipt).
9. See Sampson & Wilson, supra note 8; Sampson, supra note 8.
10. My analysis of crime and place will focus on issues that pertain primarily to the experiences of African Americans. I do this for two reasons. First, in urban areas, it is rare for other
groups to experience both the levels of isolation, conditions of poverty, and racial segregation
that African Americans experience. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993). Second, crime
data distinguishing African Americans from non-African Americans is much better than data
pertaining to criminal involvement and victimization of other groups. It should be obvious, however, that the framework on which I rely generalizes.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:669

by unemployment, family disruption, and residential instability. 1
Non-African Americans who are poor and live in urban areas are unlikely to reside in such desolate conditions. 12 This means that the
"same" poor individuals from different urban communities face different challenges. The premise of social organization theory is that differentially organized communities will be able to implement varying
levels of social control over residents.
Recent studies provide empirical confirmation of the theory's
predictions. In a study of data from the British Crime Survey, a nationwide survey of England and Wales conducted in 1982 and 1984 by
the British government, Professors Robert Sampson and Byron
Groves were able to demonstrate that the largest overall effect on personal violence offending rates came from unsupervised teen peer
groups. 13 Moreover, the data revealed that unsupervised teen peer
groups also had the largest overall effects on both victimization by
mugging and stranger violence. Importantly, the effect of unsupervised peer groups, a community-level social process, on crime
was much larger than the direct effect of socioeconomic status on
crime. This finding provides critical support of the social organization
hypothesis which emphasizes the centrality of community characteristics, rather than individual traits to predict crime. More recently,
Sampson, Stephen W. Raudenbush, and Felton Earls reported in a
breakthrough study of 8,872 residents in 343 neighborhoods in Chicago that indicia of social cohesion among neighbors is linked to reduced levels of violence. 14 Again, this newer study confirms the
findings in the Sampson and Groves study that community poverty
does not inevitably lead to crime.

11. This point has been made by numerous authors employing different approaches of evaluation. See, e.g., ELIJAH ANDERSON, STREETWISE: RACE, CLASS, AND CHANGE IN AN URBAN
COMMUNITY (1990); JOHN HAGEDORN, PEOPLE AND FOLKS: GANGS, CRIME AND THE UNDERCLASS IN A RUSTBELT Crrv (1988); CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE,
POVERTY, AND THE UNDERCLASS (1992); ALEX KoTLowrz, THERE ARE No CHILDREN HERE:
THE STORY OF Two BoYs GROWING UP IN THE OTHER AMERICA (1991); NICHOLAS LEMANN,
THE PROMISED LAND: THE GREAT BLACK MIGRATION AND How IT CHANGED AMERICA

(1991); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 10 (1993); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY

20-62 (1987).

12. See Sampson & Wilson, supra note 8, at 42 ("[R]acial differences in poverty and family
disruption are so strong that the 'worst' urban contexts in which whites reside are considerably
better than the average context of black communities.").
13. See Sampson & Groves, supra note 7, at 782-800.
14. Robert J. Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, SCIENCE, Aug. 15, 1997, at 918. This study examined neighborhoods in a way
that ensured diversity by race, ethnicity, and class. See id. at 919.
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While the relationship between the structural determinants of
weakened social processes and crime is an incredibly important facet
of social organization theory, the role of culture is also important.
The theory predicts that cohesive communities are better able to engage in informal social control that can lead to lower levels of crime
than communities that are not cohesive. But cohesive communities
exert social control by realizing common values centered on law abidingness that are reinforced among a community's residents through
daily conduct and discourse. Cultural organization in a community
facilitates social control. Communities are culturally organized when
they are able to settle on common values. In contrast, a community
with low levels of cultural organization will have wide ranging, diverse, and fragmented community values and norms. While the notion of living in a community with complete homogeneity of culture
and ideas may seem undesirable to many, it is difficult to argue against
the homogeneity of norms that prevent violent, law-breaking conduct.
Unfortunately, fragmented and diverse values that lead to law-breaking conduct flow predictably from weak community organizational
structures such as infrequent participation in formal organizations,
low levels of teen peer group supervision, and the like. Recent urban
ethnography helps to make this point.
In his book Streetwise, sociologist Elijah Anderson describes in
great detail the clash between the "decent" values (norms associated
hard work, family life, the church and law-abiding behavior) held by
some families in the urban community that Anderson calls
"Northton" and the "streetwise" values (norms associated with drug
culture, unemployment, little family responsibility, and crime) held by
others. 15 Anderson explains that the diffusion of norms in Northton
was correlated with a weakening in Northton's community-level structures. 16 Anderson's research reveals that neither streetwise values nor
decent values held sway in Northton, and it is this conclusion that is
important for the point I want to make here. Though many of
Northton's residents continued to adhere to decent values, even as the
structural factors that typically predict community cohesion began to
weaken, these residents did so in a world where they were forced to
negotiate simultaneously a significant and rival set of values-the
streetwise code of conduct-in their daily lives. Competition between
streetwise and decent values made it more difficult for law-abiding
15. See ANDERSON, supra note 11.
16. See id. at 56-111.
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Northton residents to achieve and reinforce a common set of values
among all residents in a community.
Thus, both structural organization and cultural organization in
neighborhoods help to explain the crime that occurs in them. They
are critically intertwined. Structural organization of neighborhoods is
like a system of "norm highways." The condition of this infrastructure
will either facilitate or hinder the transmission of community values

that can support law-abiding behavior.
If neighborhood characteristics matter more to the occurrence of

crime than factors such as poverty, as social organization theory
predicts is the case, 17 then the challenge for those who think about
criminal law policy is how to implement programs that help reinforce

community structures and facilitate transmission of law-abiding
norms. This challenge brings us to the limits of Shaw and McKay's
theorizing. These members of the old Chicago School of sociology

assumed that market forces, relatively independent of government intervention, naturally produced crime-facilitating community structures. 18 They were wrong. Law does matter, and government clearly
can implement polices that are destructive of the social processes and
norms that promote social organization. Analysis of the experiences
produced by the ecological context of urban inner city life through the
lens of social organization theory suggests that law enforcement poli-

cies that are beneficial to highly organized communities (and often
non-poor) may not work as well in communities that are disorganized
17. This is not to say, of course, that poverty is irrelevant. Neighborhood poverty, and
other neighborhood demographic characteristics, can detrimentally affect community social organization factors, which in turn directly affect crime.
18. Robert J. Bursik explains Shaw and McKay's market-based ecological theory this way:
"Shaw and McKay... assumed that a competitive open market naturally made certain areas of
the city more attractive for settlement and, in turn, more residentially stable than others. They
argued that this process led to variation in ability of neighborhoods to regulate themselves,
which in turn led to variation in rates of delinquency." Robert J. Bursik, PoliticalDecisionmaking and EcologicalModels of Delinquency: Conflict and Consensus, in THEORETICAL INTEGRATION IN THE STUDY OF DEVIANCE CRIME: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECrS 105, 105 (Steven F.
Messner et al. eds., 1989). So the idea was that recent immigrants would enter into areas which
were least attractive and, therefore, least expensive, gradually moving to more stable areas of the
city. See id. at 106. This model is incomplete in a world in which government policy can make a
large impact on ability of a neighborhood to organize itself. Bursik points to the exogenous
impact on structure of a community of the introduction of a large public housing project. See id.
Here and elsewhere I focus on the impact to community structure of criminal law policy. See
Tracey L. Meares, Social Organizationand Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191
(1998) [hereinafter Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement] (establishing the
relevance of community social organization to an assessment of the efficacy of drug law enforcement); see also Tracey L. Meares, It's a Question of Connections, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 579 (1997)
[hereinafter Meares, It's a Question of Connections] (describing improvement through redistribution of social capital from neighborhood teen peer groups to community adults with an interest in transmission of norms of law abidingness).
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and poor. The rest of this essay is devoted to building a case for law
enforcement policies that are reparative of community social organization in the communities most in need of them.
II.

RACE AND CRIME AND LAW AND ORDER

This exposition of the social organization explanation of crime
should make clear that the approach to crime control favored by Law
and Order Cheerleaders-increasing the prevalence, and more typically, the severity of formal sanctions for offending-is potentially
beneficial. While the theory articulated above presumes that lower
crime levels will be a consequence of the interaction of a community's
individuals with each other (friendship networks), with institutions
(formal organization participation), and with children and teens (community supervision of teen peer groups), nothing about the structure
of the argument assumes a one-way process. Empirical studies
demonstrate that factors of community guardianship can lead to lower
violent crime rates, but it also makes sense that lower crime rates
themselves should make residents more willing to engage in community guardianship in the first place. In other words, there is a feedback
loop between crime rates and community structure enhancement.
The question, therefore, is whether the law and order approach to
crime control lowers crime rates enough to produce a social organization boost, which in turn, will generate long-term crime reduction.
Cheerleaders claim that their law and order program benefits minority
inner city residents by addressing and reducing the high levels of
crime residents experience. 19 A statement made by former Attorney
General William Barr concerning heavy penalties for certain drug offenders is representative. "The benefits of increased incarceration
would be enjoyed disproportionately by Black Americans.1 20 Barr's
comment likely resonates with those Black Americans who are unable
to leave poor inner city communities for safer communities and may
desire assistance from the state to create that distance by removing
offenders.
19. John J. Dilulio, Jr., My Black Crime Problem, and Ours, Crrv JOURNAL, Spring 1996, at
14 (pointing to numerous Black leaders speaking about the problem of Black-on-Black crime
and the importance of law enforcement addressing this issue). For an argument reflecting the
sentiments of the Cheerleaders, see Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination:A Comment, 107 HARV. L. REV.1255 (1994). "Blacks subject to a relatively heavy
punishment for crack possession are burdened by it, [but] their law-abiding neighbors are helped
by it insofar as the statute deters and punishes drug trafficking in their midst." Id. at 1273.
20. MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 36
(1995) (quoting Barr).
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Unfortunately, there is a basis for skepticism towards the belief
that a program that depends entirely on the power of formal sanctions
will generate the levels of crime reduction necessary to generate social
organization improvement. First, with respect to drug law enforcement specifically, there is the problem of relying on formal sanctions
to generate substantial reduction of drug offenses through incapacitation, specific deterrence, and general deterrence. 21 But more generally, and importantly for our purposes here, there are reasons to
believe that the racial asymmetry generated from high levels of punishment of inner city offenders is ultimately likely to undermine the
goal of crime reduction. As the key concern of this symposium is the
link between race and crime, I shall focus on the race-specific reasons
that undermine the ability of a law and order program to effect substantial crime reduction in inner city communities. These reasons fall
into three general categories: stigma, linked fate, and multiple roles.
It appears fairly clear that the disproportionate involvement of
minorities (African Americans in particular) in the criminal justice
system generally stigmatizes all minorities, whether they are categorized as law breakers or law abiders. 22 This point is an unremarkable
one. Less obvious is the link between the stigmatization of minority
law abiders and their commitment to law-abiding conduct. By referring to "commitment to the law" here, I mean to adopt a normative
view of compliance whereby a social group promotes respect for government authorities and commitment to adopted laws as key values to
pass on to other members of the group. It is likely that stigmatization
of minority law abiders through law enforcement programs that generate extremely racially disproportionate incarceration rates can undermine commitment to the law by minority law abiders by fostering a
perception of illegitimacy of government among members of the stigmatized minority group. If I am correct about the connection between stigmatization of minority law abiders and attenuation in
perceptions of government legitimacy among members of this group,
then the efficacy of law and order programs in weakly socially organized communities will be compromised.

21. I have explored this issue in greater detail elsewhere. See Meares, Social Organization
and Drug Law Enforcement, supra note 18.
22. See Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians,
and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 790-92 (1994) (describing the phenomenon); see also Dinesh D'Souza, Myth of the Racist Cabbie, NAT'L REV., Oct. 9, 1995, at 36;
Walter E. Williams, The Intelligent Bayesian, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 10, 1986, at 18.
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Scholars have noted that discrimination undermines minority citizen perceptions of the fairness of the criminal justice system, but very
few link these perceptions to predictions about behavior of minority
group members.2 3 Moreover, while it is true that the link between
perceptions of legitimacy of government and compliance with the law
has long been discussed in social science literature,2 4 there has been
little empirical support for the point.25

Recent work by psychologist Tom Tyler, however, systematically
explores the connection between citizen perceptions of fairness and
legitimacy and compliance, and this work supports the claim that extreme racial asymmetry in punishment can undermine compliance
with law among minority groups. Tyler's work shows that compliance
with the law is strongly related to a citizen's perceptions of legitimacy
of government. 26 His study of the experiences, attitudes, and behavior
of a random sample of citizens in Chicago demonstrates that percep-

tions of legitimacy independently contribute to compliance. Moreover, Tyler shows that this perception has a greater impact on

compliance than fear of sanction. 27
Tyler advances a normative view of compliance with the law that
promotes the fact that people tend to comply with the law because
they believe that authorities have the right to dictate proper behavior
to them-that they believe that authorities are legitimate. 28 The nor23. For a notable exception, see Katheryn K. Russell, The Racial Hoax as Crime: The Law
as Affirmation, 71 IND. L.J. 593 (1996). Professor Russell argues that perceptions of unfairness
in the system support a theory of defiance whereby Black men especially become alienated from
"mainstream" values and become law breakers. See id. at 607-11; see also ToM R. TYLER, WHY
PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 34-35 (1990) (citing charts identifying a connection between political
alienation and support for revolutionary behavior). The link between perceived unfair treatment and protest reactions is an important point; however, here I would like to focus on the
ways in which stigma and perceptions of unfairness can affect the conduct of those who are
generally law abiding. A normative view of law-abiding behavior depends heavily on the content of norms passed among members of a group and the extent to which that information is
transmitted. In my view, the key negative consequence of perceptions of unfairness of the criminal justice system on law-abiding members of minority groups is that such perceptions lessen the
strength of norms that dictate the legitimacy of government, which, in turn, will affect compliance with the law.
24. See TYLER, supra note 23, at 22-27 (summarizing research).
25. See id. at 27.
26. See id. at 64. "People who regard legal authorities as legitimate are found to comply
with the law more frequently." Id.
27. See id. at 64-68. A caveat is in order. Professor Tyler explored adherence to laws that
would not be considered by most to be serious crimes if broken-speeding and parking violations, shoplifting, and the like. See id. at 40. Tyler's focus is on compliance with the law by those
generally considered to be law abiding. As the social organization approach to law enforcement
focuses on the behavior of law abiders, I think it is appropriate to use Tyler's research as the
foundation of my argument here.
28. See id. at 24-26. Professor Tyler also notes that people may also comply with the law
because they believe that the law dictates behavior that accords with their own sense of personal
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mative view of compliance, in contrast to an instrumental one, emphasizes the importance of the social influence of groups on individuals.
According to the normative view, when a person receives information

about government authorities from her peers indicating that government authorities have not treated people like her fairly, she will be
less committed to compliance.

Professor Tyler also shows that experience-based assessments of
both distributive fairness 2 9 and procedural fairness 30 matter a great
deal to perceptions of legitimacy and compliance. The disproportion-

ate representation of minorities in prisons is linked to notions of distributive and procedural justice in a fairly obvious way. If members of
a minority group do not believe that the prison sentences that members of their group receive are fairly distributed then they may conclude that the policy that produces the unfair distribution is

illegitimate. 31 If minority group members reach this conclusion because the law and order program produces asymmetrical incarceration
rates, then Tyler's model predicts that members of the group are less
likely to comply with the law.

The stigmatization of law-abiding minority group members that is
intimately related to racially disproportionate incarceration and minority group perceptions of (il)legitimacy connects up with this discussion. Disproportionate incarceration of African Americans is an
important "race-making" factor. 32 Just as the existence of ghettoes
(the ultimate referent of the consequences of race, place, and crime)
can define and stereotype African Americans in a negative light, prisons in which half of the inmates are African Americans define and
stereotype African Americans as criminal offenders. Both ghettoes
and predominantly African-American prisons are physical constructs
morality. Tyler warns that personal morality is "double-edged" because it may or may not comport with the dictates of legal authorities. See id. at 25-26.
29. Tyler explains that the concept of distributive fairness emphasizes the ways in which
"citizens evaluate public policies by examining the extent to which they distribute government
benefits and burdens fairly." Id. at 73.
30. "According to theories of procedural justice, citizens are not only sensitive to what they
receive from the police and the courts but also responsive to their own judgments about the
fairness of the way police officers and judges make decisions." Id. at 73 (citations omitted).
31. Empirical work indicates that Blacks are much more likely than Whites to believe that
courts are much too harsh on criminal offenders. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, ChartingRace and
Class Differences in Attitudes Toward Drug Legalizationand Law Enforcement: Lessons for Federal Criminal Law, 1 BuFF. CRIM. L. REV. 137, 155 (1997).
32. I borrow this term from Professor David James, who has written of the ghetto as a
"race-making situation." David James, The Racial Ghetto as a Race-Making Situation: The Effects of Residential Segregationon Racial Inequalities and Racial Identity, 19 L. & Soc. INOUIRY
407, 420-29 (1994) (reviewing MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 10).
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that sustain and nourish an African-American identity tied up with
criminal and deviant behavior and in opposition to "mainstream"
(read "law abiding") American identity. Ghettoes and prisons institutionalize race, and because race becomes the marker of the identity
(that is created by place), it necessarily affects all African Americans,
whether or not they reside in inner city neighborhoods of concentrated poverty or in prisons. As a result, many African Americans
must endure suspicion by both minorities and non-minorities alike,
poor service, refusals of service, and perhaps most importantly for my
argument here, erroneous arrests and accusations by the police. In
the minds of some law enforcement agents, Black skin is considered a
factor to use to decide whether an individual should be considered a
33
criminal suspect.
For obvious reasons, erroneous arrests are likely to undermine
the particular individual's assessment of the legitimacy of the state.
But even more important for this discussion, erroneous arrests affect
how an individual subjected to them discusses the legitimacy of government with his or her friends. This effect is critical to the normative
view of compliance with the law. While the individual to which I have
just referred may not argue vigorously that government deserves no
respect, at the same time, she is much less likely to vigorously and
positively promote government. This is a negative consequence for a
norm-driven view of compliance, particularly in communities where
the community structure predicts higher crime levels. To see why,
consider again the discussion of cultural organization in a community.
Weak structural social processes facilitate diversity in values and
norms governing law-abiding conduct, as Elijah Anderson's work
demonstrates. Residents of many inner city communities must negotiate the clash of inconsistent value systems that dictate acceptable behavior. When the strength of signals supporting government
legitimacy wanes, we should expect the level of commitment to compliance to wane as well. Signals supporting law-breaking behavior, on
the other hand, even while fewer in number than those supporting
law-abiding conduct, may be very strong. This phenomenon is likely
connected to the relative strength of social networks among commu33. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 140-41 (1997) (citing numerous
examples of individuals stopped by police most likely because of race); Angela J. Davis, Race,
Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 425 (1997) (discussing the problem of Black motorists being stopped disproportionately due to race); David A. Harris, "Driving While Black"
and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 544 (1997) (same).
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nity sub-groups. Teen peer groups, for example, may not be large in
number, but the norms that are generated and transmitted among
members of these cohesive groups may be very strong compared to
the norms generated and transmitted among more numerous but
weakly connected adults. This means that adults interested in transmitting law-abiding norms to youths in a community through intergenerational transfer may lose in the norm transmission
competition to teen peer groups.34 Tyler's work shows that when
there are fewer positive signals of government legitimacy within a
group to support compliance, opinions of peer groups will take their
place. 35 When peer group opinions support law breaking, there will
be a net loss of compliance among members of the stigmatized group.
In sum, the potential for stigma creation generated by the racially
asymmetrical distribution of prevalent and long sentences prescribed
by Law and Order Cheerleaders to allay the problems that minority
crime victims experiences undermines the deterrent potential of these
sentences where its needed most. Law-abiding African Americans in
poor communities, then, must bear the costs of stigma in exchange for
few benefits.
The detrimental impact that racially asymmetrical punishment
can have on the law and order approach's potential for social organization improvement through crime reduction is exacerbated by two
factors: the effect of linked fate among all African Americans and the
fact that many inner city community members occupy multiple roles
as both "law breakers" and "law abiders."
Linked fate refers to the empathy that people have with family
and friends. But it can also exist among strangers. In the AfricanAmerican community, linked fate has its foundation in the fact that
the life chances of African Americans historically have been shaped
by race. 36 The long history of race-based constraints on life chances
among Blacks generates a certain efficiency in evaluating policies that
affect minority individuals. Many African Americans may use what
political scientist Michael Dawson calls the "black utility heuristic" to
determine what in their best interests. The heuristic allows an individual to determine what is in her individual interests by relying on what
34. For a pictorial description of this process see Meares, It's a Question of Connections,
supra note 18, at 592.
35. See TYLER, supra note 23, at 63-64.
36. See MICHAEL C. DAWSON, BEHIND THE MULE: RACE AND CLASS IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLITICS 77 (1994) (explaining the linked fate concept as a means of explaining the way that
African Americans perceive what is in their individual self interest.).
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is in the best interests of the group. 37 Whether familial, social, or racial group links are considered, the outcome is likely to be the same.
Minority residents of the inner city are less likely to condemn the law
breakers among them when they experience critical bonds with them.
This bonding process clearly undermines the crime reduction power of
the law and order approach to law enforcement.
The multiple roles that many inner city residents play with respect to the categories "law breaker" and "law abider" also undermine the efficacy of the Cheerleaders' preferred plan for crime
control. By multiple roles I mean to refer to the fact that the lines
between law breakers and law abiders are not so clean and clear as the
Cheerleaders suppose. Multiple roles are inevitable in poor, structurally weak communities where it is not uncommon for law-abiding citizens to decry law breaking even as they rely on law breakers for
necessary goods such as money and security. If there are few wellpaying employment opportunities in poor communities, drug trafficking offers the promise of work and monetary benefits.38 Families that
to do not condone illegality might believe that they have to choose
between a shrinking social safety net or the illegal proceeds of drug
transactions to feed and clothe children. Multiple roles are inevitable
for another reason. In many cases victims in poor communities are
themselves law breakers in the more conventional sense. Some individual victims in high crime inner city neighborhoods, especially
between
young men, are not always victims. Instead, they oscillate
39
being a victim in one instance and an offender the next.
The ambiguity surrounding the terms law breaker and law abider
in weakly organized inner city communities can confound the Cheerleaders' aims. When lines cannot be easily drawn between law abiders
and law breakers, a regime tethered to the power of formal sanctions
to produce deterrence will be forced to raise the price of crime very
37. See id. at 10-11 (explaining that when race over-determines an individual's life chances,
it is much more efficient for that individual to use the relative and absolute status of the group as
a proxy for individual utility).
38. There are numerous accounts of the importance of drug selling as an important economic activity in inner city communities. See, e.g., PETER REUTER ET AL., MONEY FROM CRIME:
A STUDY OF THE ECONOMICS OF DRUG DEALING IN WASHINGTON, D.C., (RAND Drug Policy

Research Center No. R-3894-RF, 1990); WILSON, supra note 8; Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, The
Social Organization of Street Gang Activity in an Urban Ghetto, 103 Am. J. Soc. 82 (1997).
39. The fact that young males in the inner city are victims and offenders in serial transactions is not remarkable given the violence that occurs between rival gang members. For example, between 1987 and 1992, the average annual rate of handgun victimization among Black
males aged 16 to 19 was 39.7 out of 1000-four times that of White men in the same cohort. See
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, No.
CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY

NCJ-147004,

(1994).

YOUNG BLACK MALE VICTIMs: NATIONAL
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high indeed to insure differentiation between the two groups. Raising
the price of crime through increasing the severity of sanctions and perhaps the certainty of sanctions, though, creates an extreme risk of
asymmetry in punishment that can undermine crime reduction
through stigma generation.
Importantly, these race-based reasons for being skeptical of the
efficacy of the law and order program are reinforced by the fact that
crime and victimization is concentrated in places. What this means is
that even while the law and order approaches produces crime reduction benefits for some communities, it is much less likely to do so
where the benefits are most needed precisely because it requires the
removal and involvement in the criminal justice system of a substantial segment of the inner city population. This kind of entanglement
with the criminal justice system inevitably results in the elevation of
family disruption, unemployment, low economic status, and disincentives to invest in human capital-all precursors to social organization
disruption.4 0 Cheerleaders, therefore, confound their own ends by
generating social organization disruption even as they attempt to solve
it.
III.

RACE AND CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT SKEPTICISM

Law Enforcement Skeptics,. concerned primarily about the extreme racial asymmetry in punishment fueled by the Law and Order
Cheerleaders' approach to crime control, call for less law enforcement. Admittedly, Skeptics do not argue for such a position directly,
but their plans for reducing racial asymmetry in law enforcement outcomes basically have this effect. Skeptics are understandably concerned about the existence of, and grave potential for, racial
discrimination throughout the criminal justice system. Many conclude
that there are simply too many minority individuals behind bars. This
conclusion leads Skeptics to promote equal distribution of law enforcement outcomes by race either by prosecuting more Whites, fewer
minorities, or both. The reasoning behind this approach supports
even, as the prescribed remedy for a successful constitutional defense
of selective prosecution would require, allowing a minority defendant
who is admittedly guilty to escape punishment entirely. 4 1
40. See Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, supra note 18, for a detailed explanation of the connection between removal and social organization disruption.
41. See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996) (denying discovery claim
filed by criminal defendants seeking to squash prosecution on grounds that prosecution was
racially selective); see also Richard McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution:Discovering the
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Law Enforcement Skeptics do not see this result as negative, as
Professor Paul Butler's recent statement in the UCLA Law Review
suggests: "[W]hat's good enough for white people is good enough for
African Americans. '42 Butler is referring here to the fact that many
White law breakers escape punishment all of the time. If Whites are
systematically sheltered from subjection to drug law enforcement (as
the incarceration statistics suggest), then why shouldn't Blacks be similarly sheltered? 43 After all, Butler notes, "the white community does
not appear to suffer dire consequences from [the] relaxation of prosecution of victimless crime." 44
Butler has advocated a widely publicized program of racially selective jury nullification, primarily in cases involving "victimless"
crimes (he characterizes drug offenses as victimless), to balance the
racial scales with respect to imprisonment. 45 In another recent piece,
Butler calls explicitly for affirmative action in law enforcement. 46 The
concept is simple: compared to Whites, Blacks receive much too
much attention from law enforcement authorities. To rectify this imbalance, it is necessary to scale back the application of law enforcement among Blacks, and in some cases, disable the application of law
enforcement (such as in drug possession cases) until the numbers of
Blacks prosecuted, incarcerated, etc., reflect the numbers of Whites
subjected to these treatments. Butler recommends six proposals for
affirmative action in criminal law as a race-conscious remedy designed
to correct the racial imbalance of Blacks involved in the criminal justice system: (1) retribution must be prohibited from justifying punishment of African Americans; (2) rehabilitation must be the primary
justification for Black punishment; (3) Black criminal defendants
Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 605 (1998) (criticizing Armstrong for blocking meritorious selective prosecution claims).
42. Paul Butler, The Evil of American CriminalJustice: A Reply, 44 UCLA L. REV. 143, 154
(1996).
43. Butler notes that "African Americans do not disproportionately use illegal drugs, yet
they comprise more than seventy percent of people incarcerated for such conduct." Paul Butler,
Affirmative Action and the Criminal Law, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 841, 884 (1997). These statistics

suggest that Blacks are incarcerated at numbers all out of their proportion to use, providing
support for Butler's argument supporting the restriction of prosecution of Blacks who possess
drugs. But these numbers also reveal the dangers of aggregation. See infra text accompanying
notes 54-57.
44. Butler, supra note 42, at 154.
45. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the CriminalJustice
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995); see, e.g., Patricia Cohen, One Angry Man: Paul Butler Wants
Black Jurorsto Put Loyalty to Race Above Loyalty to the Law, WASH. POST, May 30, 1997, at B1;
Clarence Page, OverridingLaw to Create Justice, BALT. SUN, Nov. 16, 1995, at 29A; When Jurors
Ignore the Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1997, at A16.
46. See Butler, supra note 43.
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should have Black majority juries authorized to sentence them; (4)
Black defendants must not be subject to a death sentence in an interracial homicide case; (5) Blacks must be arrested, tried, and sentenced
for drug crimes in proportion to their actual commission of these offenses; (6) by the year 2000, the prison population should look like
47
America.
In the same vein, Professor Angela Jordan Davis has written of
the role that prosecutors play in generating racial disproportion in
criminal justice system processing. 48 She notes that the causes of this
disproportion range from intentional discrimination to the racially disparate impact of policies that create greater hurdles for those who are
poor than those who are not. Davis argues that the bottom line is that
racial disproportion in processing affects Black people to a greater extent than it affects Whites, and she argues that prosecutors have an
obligation to do something to remedy the problem. Davis advocates
the use of racial impact studies in prosecution offices as a method of
making prosecutors more sensitive to racial disproportion in their
charging practices. Specifically, Professor Davis charges the prosecutor to take action to balance racially prosecutions once the prosecutor
determines through the use of racial impact studies that there is a
large difference between African-American arrest rates and the percentage of African Americans in a city or county's population.
Clearly, these Skeptics' primary goal is to even out the racial balance sheet by equalizing the distribution of the "benefit" of negative
law enforcement. 49 To be sure, they are not in favor of equalizing the
racial balance sheet without looking beneath the numbers. Professor
Butler, for example, is very concerned about violent crime. He is not
troubled by the fact that minority offenders who disproportionately
engage in violent crimes will be disproportionately subject to punishment. Butler "writes off" violent criminal offenders, stating that the
nullification program he suggests should not be applied to them. 50
Similarly, Professor Davis's racial impact studies are to determine not
only disproportionate arrest rates, but also whether African Ameri47. See id. at 877-88.
48. See Angela Jordan Davis, Race and Prosecution: The Power and Privilege of Discretion,
(Aug. 22, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Chicago-Kent Law Review).
49. If the application of traditional formal law enforcement sanctions is considered "positive" law enforcement, then we can call withdrawal of these sanctions "negative" law enforcement. I place the word benefit in quotes on purpose. Whether negative law enforcement
constitutes a benefit is a very ambiguous issue for reasons I will detail in more depth infra.
50. See Butler, supra note 45, at 719 (arguing that African Americans who kill other African
Americans should not have access to the benefits of nullification because "the black community
cannot afford the risks of leaving this person in its midst").
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cans commit the crime in question at a greater rate than Whites do. 51

If there is evidence of greater minority offending, then Professor Davis would not require the prosecutor to divert from the usual course of
prosecution.
What does social organization theory have to say about these ap-

proaches? For one thing, the theory suggests that a program that has
as its primary goal the reduction of racial disparity in formal sanctions
holds potential for social organization improvement over the proscribed course of action advocated by Law and Order Cheerleaders.
For example, while the Cheerleaders' reliance on very prevalent
and increasingly severe prison sentences can undermine the structural
components of social organization in communities where the treatment's application is concentrated, the Skeptics' approach of reducing
the numbers of minority offenders sent to prison (especially for nonviolent offenses) would at least tend to stanch these effects. It is likely

that the Skeptics' program to reduce the numbers of minorities sent to
prison by equalizing their numbers with those of Whites processed by
the system would not overtly contribute to family disruption or impair
offenders' incentives to accumulate human capital in the way that sad52
dling someone with a felony conviction predictably will.

Moreover, reducing racial disparity in convictions could positively enhance perceptions of government legitimacy among members

of minority groups by reversing the conditions that support stigmatization of minority law abiders. Decreases in the stigmatization of all
members of a minority group should be associated with higher levels

of commitment to government legitimacy. Greater normative commitment to government legitimacy should, according to Professor
Tyler's theory, promote greater compliance with the law, which would

contribute to a community's organization around norms of law abid51. See Davis, supra note 48. Even though Professor Davis's plan focuses on African
Americans, there is little reason why her program could not be generalized to other minority
groups.
52. A felony conviction on one's record makes it incredibly difficult to compete in the formal labor market where it often becomes necessary to reveal such information on a job application. But more than this, a felony conviction can inhibit an offender's desire to invest in human
capital that can open up new job possibilities. Moreover, when an offender makes the decision
to refrain from further human capital investment, he weakens existing relationships he has with
people who will be less likely to depend on him because his ability to provide them with benefits
through interaction is compromised. Additionally, the individual who decides not to make further investments in education, skills, and training cuts himself off from potential useful relationships with others who have no incentive to form relationships with him in the first place.
Increasing the percentage of those with felony convictions in the community population compromises the generation of social capital that can be directed toward crime reduction. See
Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, supra note 18.
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ingness. Thus, the racial redistribution program potentially can address the attacks on the social structure of inner city communities
launched by the law and order program, and it can also promote cultural organization around law-abiding norms in communities that desperately need this help.
These all are admittedly positive effects. Still, it is necessary to
ask how likely it is that these positive effects will be produced by the
Skeptics' program of racial redistribution in punishment. I have already demonstrated that social organization theory exposes the flaws
in the Cheerleaders' preferred approach. The theory also reveals the
problems in the Skeptics' racial redistribution remedy. The Cheerleaders pay insufficient attention to the racial distribution of punishment, but Skeptics pay too much attention to it. The key issues that
must be addressed are the heterogeneity of minority groups and policy
vacuums.
Consider heterogeneity first. Racial disparities in the criminal
justice system are often measured at highly aggregated levels. Skeptics engage these disparities at similarly aggregated levels. Professor
Davis, for instance, imagines racial impact studies taking place at the
county level. And Professor Butler's proposals are, in some cases, national. Moreover, Skeptics pay little attention to the background differences of offenders. Professor Butler proposes to equalize the
number of Blacks incarcerated for possession of drugs with the
number of Whites incarcerated, regardless of the particular circumstances of the case. What is important to him is that each individual
has been convicted of felony drug possession, and that is all that is
relevant. Skeptics treat each individual offender as if he or she were
interchangeable with all of the other members of the group. All of the
individuals of a racial group are aggregated together into one
"community."
There is certainly good reason to discuss groups in terms of a
"Black community" and a "White community." The idea of linked
fate advanced earlier provides both a theoretical and an empirical
foundation for referring to Blacks in this way. Linked fate cuts across
boundaries and contexts, providing a basis to define a community with
little reference to background characteristics of the community's individual members. Similarly, there is growing literature that discusses
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racial solidarity among White Americans that are reinforced by law, 53

lending theoretical support to the notion of a White community.
However, while there often are many similarities among individuals who can be lumped together into "raced" communities, there often
are differences among these individuals that matter a great deal to the
discussion of crime. For example, the statistics regarding drug use to

which Professor Butler refers aggregate felony drug use of all kindsfrom marijuana usage to heroin usage. 54 Most jurisdictions in this
country vary punishments for certain types of drugs;5 5 moreover, there
is no reason to suspect that the usage rates of various drugs within
different racial groups will be the same. The 1992 NationalHousehold
Survey on Drug Abuse indicates that the usage rate of hallucinogens
in the past year by Whites 18-25 years old was ten times higher than
the rate for Blacks the same age. 56 Therefore, to say that Blacks use

illegal drugs in proportion to their representation in the population
does not tell us much about what we really need to know. What we
really need to know is the usage rate of the drugs most likely to sub-

ject an individual to incarceration.
Of course, the heterogeneity in usage rates would have to be outrageously high to justify the fact that over 70% of those incarcerated

(meaning those sentenced either to a jail or prison term) for felony
drug possession were Black. But this number, too, reveals the danger
of aggregation. When the pools of Whites and Blacks convicted of

felony drug offenses in 1992 (the year of data on which Butler relies)
are compared, it turns out that almost the same percentages of Blacks
and Whites were incarcerated for felony drug possession-74% of

53. See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness As Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993); Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict. The Economics of Group Status Production and
Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003 (1995).
54. See Butler, supra note 43, at 884; Butler, supra note 45, at 719.
55. Florida, California, Texas, New York, and Illinois, five states known to have sizable
illegal drug problems, all have widely varying penalties for possession of and trafficking in narcotics and marijuana. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 220.00-221.55, 70.00-70.40 (McKinney 1998
& Supp. 1998) (New York penalties for possession and sale of narcotics to those for possession
and sale of marijuana); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 481.112-481.121 (West Supp.,
1998), TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §. 12.21-12.35 (West Supp. 1998) (same for Texas); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 893.13, 775.082 (West Supp. 1998) (same for Florida); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 11350, 11352, 11357, 11360 (same for California); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 570/401, 570/
402, 550/4, 550/5 (West Supp. 1998), 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN., 5/5-8-1, 5/5-8-3 (West Supp.
1998) (same for Illinois).
56. See SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., OFFICE OF APPLIED
STUDIES, NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD DRUG ABUSE SURVEY: MAIN FINDINGS 1992, at 77 tbl.5.5
(Jan. 1995).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:669

Blacks and 75% of Whites. 57 Skeptics are much less concerned about
within-group treatment than they are concerned about the extent to
which Blacks occupy the total pie of individuals incarcerated for felony drug possession. In 1992 that rate was 55%, not 70%.58 Not a
number to be proud of, to be sure, but a number that is substantially
lower than the Skeptics claim. Although Whites and Blacks have similar within-group rates of incarceration for felony drug possession,
there is a difference in the treatment of the two groups of drug offenders. Blacks are more likely to go to prison, while Whites are more
likely to go to jail.5 9 This is a difference that could be driven both by
the offenders' background characteristics (such as whether he or she
had a criminal record) and the type of drug the offender possessed
(was the drug crack cocaine or marijuana?).
Skeptics do not get bogged down in these details. But the social
organization approach to crime control demands attention to details
that are often produced by place. Race and place are important. It is
because both race and place are important that the social organization
view of community is more confined than the notion of community
that the Skeptics rely on. Though the social organization view of community is not wholly bound by a narrow concept of space, as friendship networks and the overlapping contexts for norm enforcement
that participation in formal organizations creates can and do exceed
the confines of neighborhood boundaries, some conception of space
and place limits the relevant community. The social organizationbased analysis of law enforcement efficacy depends on taking seriously the notion of a community created by linked fate, but the social
organization view cannot stop there.
The Black community is heterogeneous, and the Black urban
poor are more likely than wealthier Blacks to reside in communities
whose social organization predicts social control difficulties. The
Skeptics' racial redistribution program, in order to be congenial to the
social organization view of crime reduction, must produce reductions
in incarceration of minorities at higher levels in the specific areas that
are the most weakly organized because those places are damaged the
most through high rates of removal under the law and order approach
57. See SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 501 tbl.5.50 (Kathleen Maguire &
Ann L. Pastore, eds. 1996) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK]; see also CORAMAE RICHEY MANN, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: A QUESTION OF COLOR 36-45 (explaining the importance of within-group comparisons as contrasted with between group comparisons).

58. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 57, at 498 tbl.5.46.
59. See id. at 501 tbl.5.50.
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to crime control. Nothing about the racial redistribution programs reviewed so far, however, requires racial redistribution of law enforcement outcomes to be allocated so that the structurally weakest places
receive most of the negative law enforcement benefit. In fact, it is
likely that the places in which offending is highest will produce the
lowest percentage-wise reductions in incarceration if the Skeptics' approach is followed.
Current incarceration rates of drug offenders can help illustrate
my point. According to the 1991 Survey of Prison Inmates,60 the largest chunk of Black drug offenders incarcerated in state prisons were
those with less than a high school education convicted of a trafficking
offense. These individuals are much more likely than those with more
education to have come from circumstances of concentrated poverty-the places to which I devote much of my attention.6 1 Traffick62
ing, not felony possession, drives the incarceration rates for prison.
Imprisoned drug traffickers come from all walks of life-educated,
and non-educated, minority and non-minority. But the Survey of
Prison Inmates reveals that those who are more educated are more
likely than those who are less educated to be imprisoned for possession. This is true for Blacks and Whites. Of course, this piece of data
is to be expected. Drug trafficking is an important economic activity
for unemployed residents of weakly organized inner city communities.63 No one should be surprised that minority residents of these
communities are much more likely to engage in-and be caughtdealing drugs than minority residents of wealthier more stable
communities.
The upshot of this point should be clear, however. By overlooking the real heterogeneity of the Black community, the Skeptic program of racial redistribution of incarceration rates for drug possession
through withdrawal of law enforcement is much more likely to redound to the benefit of more educated (and wealthier) Blacks than
60. The survey is compiled by the Bureau of Justice Statistics ("BJS") and is available at the
BJS web site. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Survey of State Prison Inmates, 1991 (visited Apr. 2,
1998) <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/sospi9l.htm> [hereinafter 1991 Survey of Prison Inmates]. The latest date for which the Survey is available is 1991. It is critical to use the Survey
for my analysis, because unlike other more recent data, it is possible to do individual level analyses that enables a researcher to categorize data by race, class, offense category etc. Aggregate
data do not allow such analysis.
61. Education level is considered to be a fairly good proxy for class. Many of the hyperpoor areas in inner cities are characterized by high rates of low educational attainment.
62. Those imprisoned for trafficking comprise 70% of all imprisoned drug offenders. See
1991 Survey of Prison Inmates, supra note 60.
63. See supra note 38.
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less educated (and poorer) ones. 64 Social organization improvement,
though, depends on programs geared toward the needs of the most
disadvantaged. Like affirmative action programs to promote more diverse racial representation in construction contracts and admissions to
institutions of higher learning, a program that racially redistributes the
benefit of negative law enforcement with respect to drug possession
offenses are likely to "cream" the most advantaged minorities from
the pool of those eligible to receive this benefit. 65 This is true even
though one would expect affirmative action in the criminal law, unlike
other affirmative action programs, to deal almost by definition with
the marginalized.
This argument should not be read as a claim that racial redistribution of negative law enforcement will have no effect in weakly organized communities. It certainly may have some effect. Neither is this
critique a claim that redistribution of law enforcement outcomes is a
bad idea. Quite the contrary, my point is that Law Enforcement
Skeptics aren't aggressive enough in their thinking. Getting out of
66
Egypt is not the same as getting out of Egypt and getting to Canaan.
This Biblical allusion brings me to the second potential problem
with Skeptics' approach. Their program concentrates on removing
substantial quantities of formal sanction from the Black community.
Yet, they advocate no positive program to help regenerate inner city
communities plagued by crime. Their approach produces programmatic vacuums in inner city communities, and these vacuums are the
evidence of the lack of aggressiveness in their thinking.
The reality is that many residents of inner city communities desire
levels of policing in their neighborhoods that are higher than they currently receive. Their desire for more policing is not surprising. Certainly the prevalence of drug retailing and use in inner city
communities is one reason behind it. Drug dealing behind closed
doors in the suburbs is fundamentally different from open-air drug
64. Other reasons why this might be true is that it is unlikely that this program will be
implemented without any regard to the individual offender's background and characteristics.
While the poor drug possessor receives intensive probation, the middle class one receives probation and family monitoring.
65. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 7, at 197 (arguing that "creaming" prevented the masses of
disadvantaged Blacks from having access to broad avenues of upward mobility); WILSO N, supra
note 11, at 112-18, 146-47 (1987) (same); Deborah C. Malamud, Class-BasedAffirmative Action:
Lessons and Caveats, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1847, 1861 n.51 (1996) (citing numerous sources in support
of Wilson's argument).
66. I am referring, of course, the story of the Israelites exodus from Egypt recounted in the
Bible. Once the Israelites left Egypt, it took them forty years to make what should have been a
ten day trip to the Promised Land, Canaan.
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dealing in inner city communities that too often are structurally weak
and have difficulty maintaining social control. Open-air drug dealing
is more likely than covert dealing to attract street violence. It also
makes people fearful. Each of these predictable effects of open-air
drug dealing compromises community cohesion. Many suburban
communities contain social buffers that allow them to absorb the negative consequences of the drug dealing and use that occurs there, so
the failure to actively pursue those guilty of felony drug possession in
socially cohesive suburbs will make much less of a difference in those
communities. In crime-filled inner city communities, social buffers are
thin. Simply taking away law enforcement among those who possess
drugs from these places does little to address the problems that the
existence of open-air drug dealing and other issues of disorder can
fuel. In this world, it is strange to consider withdrawal of law enforcement a benefit.
As one of the main theses of this essay is that too much law enforcement in a weakly organized community can generate social organization disruption, it may seem that my argument is now at cross
purposes. Lowering the exposure of minority individuals to law and
order-type law enforcement may indeed reduce the harm that this approach imposes on too many poor neighborhoods. But the real issue
is whether simply reducing the prevalence of law and order-type law
enforcement in weakly organized communities will promote community regeneration. That is the challenge that the social organization
view poses to Skeptics.
Skeptics have an answer for this challenge. They maintain that
there is no hope of addressing crime in poor minority communities
until social policy addresses income inequality. They conclude, like
sociologist Douglas Massey, that high crime is inevitable when minority groups are residentially segregated by race and class and also experience high rates of poverty.67 Massey puts his hopes primarily in
legal strategies that promote residential desegregation, and Skeptics

67. A particularly rigid version of this view can be found in Douglas S. Massey, Getting
Away With Murder: Segregation and Violent Crime in Urban America, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1203,
1223-24 (1995). Massey argues that high crime is the inevitable outgrowth of the social conditions created by class and race segregation and high rates of Black poverty. See id. But see John
J. Dilulio, Jr., Comment on Douglas Massey's Getting Away With Murder: Segregation and Violent Crime in Urban America, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1275 (1995) (criticizing Massey's view).
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join Massey and other sociologists who promote greater attention to
"root causes" to address crime in inner cities. 68
Providing inner city residents with more jobs and better housing
is part of social organization improvement of inner city communities,
but these macrolevel social programs are not the exclusive means of
social organization improvement. The Skeptics' view of the value and
benefits of law enforcement for inner city communities is unduly narrow. Because one of the main factors that predicts social organization
disruption is crime itself, as well as the fear of crime, then law enforcement that promotes security is an important component of a program
to improve social organization. But the Skeptics do not see this point.
Like the Law and Order Cheerleaders, Skeptics confine their view of
law enforcement to the deterrent effects of formal sanctions. Skeptics
note that the potential to purchase deterrence through formal sanctions is slim, so they give up on law enforcement and limit their arguments for government intervention to massive social programs to
redistribute wealth. The reality is that the political will to enact these
programs is lower than at any point in the last thirty years. When
Skeptics focus the bulk of their time and on advocacy of these
macrolevel social programs to exclusion of other options, they engage
in an exercise in futility.
Skeptics should embrace what social organization theory makes
clear-government can do more than attempt to price an individual
offender out of criminal behavior by raising formal sanction levels.
Government can, through law enforcement policies consistent with social organization improvement, enhance inner city community residents' ability to more effectively transmit and promulgate norms that
promote compliance with the law. This view of law enforcement has
as its goal the manipulation of the community social structures that
generate social capital directed toward law abidingness. Importantly,
this view of law enforcement has as its target law abiders instead of
law breakers.
IV.

RACE AND CRIME AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION IMPROVEMENT

To address the problems that occur when traditional forms of law
enforcement are concentrated in poor, inner city neighborhoods, and
to address the excesses of a position that attempts to counteract the
68. See, e.g., Sampson & Wilson, supra note 8, at 37-54 (calling for macrolevel social programs to improve housing and provide jobs for residents of communities of concentrated
poverty).
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negative consequences of the law and order approach through racial
redistribution that likely disables law enforcement in communities
that desperately need it, we must adopt a place-centered vision of law
enforcement-one that encourages law-abiding residents of inner city
communities to engage in private social control through the promulgation and transmission of norms. In other words, law enforcement that
is conducive to social organization improvement is the key.
The last part of this essay provides a road map to construct the
"norm highways" necessary for social organization improvement
through law enforcement. Three principles will be emphasized here.
First, the social organization disruption effects of law enforcement
should be redistributed away from poor, inner city communities. This
means that policy makers should keep racial distribution of law enforcement effects in mind, but they should do so within a spatial context. Second, law enforcement policy should attempt to redistribute
social capital away from youths and teens towards adults who are in
the best position to promulgate and transmit law-abiding norms in inner city communities with crime problems. And, last, and perhaps
most important (and controversial), we must be willing to accept that
the law abider-focused social organization improvement model of law
enforcement may not look at all like any type of law enforcement that
we've ever seen. Such a model likely involve explicit and strong relationships between the police and organizations that have not typically
worked with the police in the past in poor, minority neighborhoods,
such as the church.
A.

Racial and Spatial Redistribution of Law Enforcement
Outcomes

Law enforcement policies that generate high levels of incarceration of geographically concentrated offenders will inevitably lead to
family disruption, unemployment, and low economic status. These are
the factors that disrupt the community-level social processes that provide law-abiding individuals with incentives to build the important
networks that reinforce the crime-fighting potential of law-enforcement policies. With respect to some offenses, such as violent crimes,
the benefits of removing offenders from the community may well outweigh the social organization disruption consequences, for the prevalence of violent crime generates fear that can lead to residential
withdrawal from community life. If the removal of violent offenders is
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linked to the reduction of violent crime, a social organization benefit
should follow.
However, in the many cases involving non-violent, 69 consensual

crimes such as drug possession or low-level drug retailing, the negative
consequences of removal of non-violent offenders on community level
social organization is more clear. Removal of large numbers of these

offenders will confound rather than enhance crime fighting goals for
at least two reasons. First, because non-violent offenders are more
numerous than violent offenders, large scale removal of non-violent
offenders will inevitably have a large impact on inner city community

social structures. In absolute terms, removal of non-violent offenders
will have a greater impact on a community's population and social
structures. Second, because those considered law abiders in the com-

munities in question often rely in some ways on the law-breaking conduct of non-violent offenders, removal of these offenders will be

detrimental to these families.
If law enforcement could be re-engineered in certain contexts so

that the negative consequences of it were not visited upon weakly organized communities, there would be obvious benefits. First, the confounding effect of the law and order approach in the inner city
community would be lessened. Second, this benefit would not be

purchased at the expense of removing law enforcement from crimehampered neighborhoods. The question, then, is how can this be
done?
Start with drug law enforcement. Law and Order Cheerleaders
focus their attention on the low-level retail dealer. There is nothing
irrational about this. Most people think that those who sell drugs are
more culpable than those who simply use or possess them. 70 The standard economic approach to deterrence suggests that we should penal-

69. Note that drug offending is a particular species of non-violent crime in that the victims
are often outside of the relevant transaction. This is obviously not the case with theft and burglary, two crimes typically considered non-violent. At the same time, individuals who steal
sometimes do so to help their families, and these offenders are much more numerous than violent offenders. The social organization thesis suggests that removal should be used very sparingly-even in cases involving theft and burglary, but it is true that the case for non-removal is
less strong here as compared to the case for non-removal of non-violent drug offenders.
70. For example, 75% of the respondents to a national survey conducted by Gallup in 1996
stated that criminal penalties should be more severe for drug sellers than for drug users. See
THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION, THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, CONSULT
WITH AMERICA: A LOOK AT How AMERICANS VIEW THE COUNTRY'S DRUG PROBLEM 34
(March 1996). Interestingly, African Americans were more likely than other groups to believe
that drug users should be punished more harshly than drug sellers. See id. at 33.
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ize more heavily those activities we'd like to deter most,7 1 and if cost

is a consideration then it makes sense to target geographically concentrated sellers rather than geographically dispersed buyers. The problem with this strategy, I've suggested, is that targeting low-level
retailer drug sellers in the ghetto will concentrate negative effects of
law enforcement in weakly organized communities, which, in turn, will
lead to social organization disruption.
Targeting buyers, however, will reverse these effects and redirect
negative law enforcement consequences out of inner city communities. This is because drug buyers are much more demographically diverse than drug dealers. 72 In fact, many purchasers of drugs come
from neighborhoods that are much wealthier and more socially cohesive than neighborhoods in which open-air drug markets are prevalent. 73 Buyer-targeting will, of course, expose buyers from poor, inner
city communities to some punishment, but the consequences for these
individuals (and thus for the community) will not approach the severe
penalties typically visited upon low-level drug sellers. In Illinois, for
example, buyers caught in reverse drug stings are often charged with
misdemeanor drug possession, exposing the defendant to no more
than six months in jail and perhaps impoundment of his or her car,
74
while manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance is a felony.
Another example of social organization improving redistribution
of law enforcement outcomes involves focusing on targeting those
who solicit sex workers in inner city communities. Like drug buyers,
these solicitors often come from communities outside of the ones in
which prostitutes openly walk the streets. Concentrating primarily on
71. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT

IN CRIME CONTROL 204-205 (1973) (discussing Cesare Beccaria's "step-ladder" approach to punishment gradations).
72. In 1985, approximately 11.4% of current cocaine users were Black-roughly the percentage of African Americans in the population. See John P. Walters, Race and the War on
Drugs, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 107, 135 cht.23 (1994). In 1988, 15.3% of current cocaine users
were Black. See id. at 136 cht.24. By 1991, 21.8% of current cocaine users were Black. See id. at
137 cht.25.
73. See City of Chicago Community Policing home page, Reverse Sting Nabs Drug Buyers
(visited Feb. 6, 1998) <http://www.ci.chi.il.us/CommunityPolicing/SuccessStories/Distll.96.03b.html> (discussing the fact that many of those nabbed in reverse drug stings conducted in Chicago's high-crime 11th Police District are suburbanites); see also Maria Alvarez, Gangs, Drugs
Combine ForA Deadly Year In City, HARTFORD CouRANT, Jan. 1, 1995, at Al (discussing the
use of reverse drug stings as part of a multi-faceted strategy in Hartford, Connecticut); John W.
Fountain, Drug Buyers, Stay At Home: Marchers Take Message To Suburbs, CHn. TRIB., Chicagoland Section, Sept. 30, 1994, at 1 (describing a march to a Chicago suburb by residents of Chicago's West Garfield community the day after a reverse drug sting in West Garfield collected 100
potential drug buyers, 80% of whom were from Chicago suburbs).
74. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/401, 402 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997).
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those who market sexual services can generate social organization disruption, but targeting solicitors can reverse these effects. Moreover,
penalties can be imposed on solicitors that take advantage of the fact
that they often reside in socially organized communities. Communities in which social networks are strong are fertile ground for alternative sanctions involving attempts to invoke shame. For example, in
addition to impounding the solicitor's car, it may also be useful to
publish that person's name and photo in the local newspaper where
75
that person resides.
Because the communities in the greatest need of social organization improvement are often overwhelmingly minority, spatially redistributed law enforcement outcomes by definition produce racial
redistribution as well. The racial redistribution aspect of the law enforcement policies outlined here is very important to the social organization improvement project. While the policies mentioned here
redistribute the effects of law enforcement outcomes away from inner
city communities to produce a structural benefit for the community,
the policies also reconstruct the "face" of the offenders in a way that
contributes to cultural organization of inner city communities. By remaking the image of the criminal offender, these policies help to alleviate the constructive power of incarceration rates on the stereotypes
that fuel the stigmatization of law-abiding people of color. Given the
earlier discussion of the link between stigmatization of law abiders
and compliance, the benefits of this process should be obvious.
B.

Redistribution of Social Capital Within Inner City Communities

Youth peer group control is a critical component of community
cohesiveness that can prevent crime. Here, too, law enforcement can
play a role in assisting inner city residents in the task of communitybased youth supervision. In poor urban communities, where the parent to child ratio is extremely low, assistance by the state in youth
supervision may be critical. 76
75. See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, U. CHI. L. REv. 591, 632
n.158 (1996) (pointing to numerous examples of shameful publicity for men convicted of soliciting prostitutes).
76. Chicago Housing Authority ("CHA") data collected in August 1991 indicate that the
ratio of individuals fifteen years old and older to those fourteen and under living in the Robert
Taylor Homes and Stateway Gardens projects, two contiguous CHA housing projects, was 0.946.
See THE CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY, STATISTICAL PROFILE 10 (1992). A tabulation of 1990

census data indicates that the poorest census tract in the United States contains Stateway Gardens, and same study shows that the Robert Taylor Homes are located in one of the ten poorest
census tracts. See Flynn McRoberts & Terry Wilson, CHA Has 9 Of 10 Poorest Areas In U.S.,
Study Says, CHI. TRIB., Chicagoland Section, Jan. 26, 1995, at 1. To put this ratio in perspective,
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I have in mind loitering and curfew ordinances that keep teens
from congregating at night. Teens standing on street corners are more
likely to attract the ire of rival gang members, pick fights, or help
friends hidden in alleys to sell drugs. By enforcing these laws, police
can help adults simply by acting as additional eyes and ears in the
neighborhood. By enforcing these laws police also interfere with the
signals that these youths send each other by "hanging out," thus weakening the social bonds that support street gangs. When police assist
adults in community guardianship and help to alleviate the pressure
that teens feel to stay out at night, they play a role in redistributing
social networks away from youths in a community in favor of adults in
order to facilitate the transmission of law-abiding norms from a com77
munity's adults to its children.
Skeptics may object that, unlike the spatial redistribution procedures described above, curfews and loitering laws do not racially redistribute law enforcement outcomes. In fact, Skeptics might argue,
these laws may be enforced to a greater extent against the residents of
poor, inner city neighborhoods as opposed to wealthier ones. If this is
the case, Skeptics would likely conclude that enforcement of these
laws is inconsistent with the goals of social organization improvement
that I have already outlined.
Even if these measures are enforced to a greater extent in inner
city communities than wealthy suburban ones, that is not a reason to
object to them. First and foremost, inner city residents themselves
often are the primary political force behind the enactment of these
measures in large urban areas. These residents are entitled to make a
judgment for themselves that this type of policing best meets the
needs of their communities. 78 Second, the specific law enforcement
strategies mentioned here can help to improve the structural components of community organization by removing signs of disorder from
the neighborhood and by clearing the way for community residents to
reassert neighborhood control.
A policy that is designed to redistribute social networks within
communities should be sensitive to the racial impact of the law's ennote that the same ratio for residents of Hyde Park, the Chicago community in which the University of Chicago is located, is 5.77. The data underlying this calculation are located at <http://
www.cagis.uic.edu/demographics/demographics- intro.html>, a web site run by the Anthropology Department at the University of Illinois at Chicago.
77. For a more detailed explanation of this process see Meares, It's a Question of Connections, supra note 18.
78. See Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, When Rights Are Wrong, ATLANrnc MONTHLY,
(forthcoming Aug. 1998).
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forcement. Curfews, for example, should limit a police officer's discretion because these laws do not require an officer to assess conduct
or determine whether a child is in a gang. Rather, curfews apply to all
children out of their homes after the designated hour, regardless of
their racial background. It is true that an officer could deliberately
fail to enforce a curfew in a racially discriminatory manner. But that
is true for all laws. There is nothing about a youth curfew on its face
that invites the pernicious exercise of discretion.
Loitering ordinances, like curfews, can be designed in a way that
limits pernicious police discretion. Chicago's anti-gang loitering ordinance is an example. In 1992 the Chicago City Council passed an ordinance to restrict gang-related congregations in public ways. 79 The
ordinance was designed to respond to the grievances of citizens concerned about commonly occurring criminal street gang activity in their
neighborhoods, such as drive-by shootings, fighting, and open-air drug
dealing. By loitering in alleyway entrances and on street corners, drug
dealers both solicited business and warned hidden compatriots of police patrols. Unlike the loitering ordinances of yesteryear, 80 Chicago's
ordinance placed meaningful constraints on police discretion. For example, only designated officers, usually gang tactical unit members, in
each police district, were permitted to enforce the ordinance. Additionally, the designated police officers were permitted to enforce the
ordinance only in specified areas of a district with demonstrated, unambiguous problematic gang activity. These limits were specified by a
general order implementing the legislation. 81 Finally, the alderman of
each ward in Chicago reserved the power to decide whether the ordinance should be enforced in his or her district, insuring greater political accountability in the enforcement of the ordinance.
Despite the guidance to law enforcement these regulations provided, the Illinois Supreme Court struck down Chicago's anti-gang loi82
tering ordinance as a violation of federal substantive due process.
The Court refused to even consider the relevance of the implementing
regulations, 83 preferring instead to assume that law enforcement
would be adequately cabined merely because the Court foreclosed en79. See CHICAGO, ILL., CODE § 8-4-015 (1992). This ordinance has been struck down as a
violation of substantive due process. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53 (Ill. 1997).
80. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Shuttlesworth v. City
of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965).
81. See Chicago Police Department General Order 92-4 (Aug. 7, 1992) (specifying guidelines for enforcement of Chicago's anti-gang loitering ordinance).
82. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53 (Ill. 1997).
83. See id. at 64.
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forcement of the loitering ordinance as a policy tool. Unfortunately,
the Court's assumptions are wrong. Police discretion is like a balloon.
Pressing in on the balloon in one area simply displaces air to another.
The upshot of this observation is that those who adopt the Illinois
Supreme Court's view of liberty enhancement may advocate a position that is more, rather than less, liberty constraining at the end of
the day. It may sound strange to some readers that I have argued that
loitering laws enhance liberty of minority individuals in inner city
communities. But consider the alternative vision of law enforcement
advanced by law and order supporters-long and prevalent prison
terms for even the lowest-level criminal offenders. 84 As my colleague
Dan Kahan has suggested, "[t]he kids whom the police can't order off
the streets today are the same ones they'll be taking off to jail
85
tomorrow."
It is thus a mistake to conclude that social organization improvement cannot take place without shifting law enforcement outcomes
away from inner city communities.
C. A New Vision for Law Enforcement
Each of the programs I have discussed so far involves rethinking
a relatively traditional approach to law enforcement in terms of social
organization improvement to assist law-abiding residents of high
crime neighborhoods to help themselves avert crime. The social organization approach to law enforcement is not limited to refashioning
existing law enforcement, however. It goes much further. In fact, the
full potential of the approach can only be redeemed by thinking about
ways to bring individuals to community-level social processes and to
promote methods of integrating institutions particularly suited to the
task of crime reduction. Certain community institutions are in the
business of generating norms that enhance the cultural organization of
a community around law-abiding behavior. Schools are in this business, but there is another institution with an even clearer norm-generating mission-the church. If law enforcement agencies are able to
appropriate the social capital production of the church in weakly organized communities, then there will likely be a net social organization improvement effect.
84. This, of course, is the effect of some three strikes laws. Research indicates that an inordinate number of individuals subjected to California's three strikes laws receive life sentences for
a third strike of marijuana possession. See Fox Butterfield, Tough Law on Sentences Is Criticized, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1996, at A14.
85. Dan M. Kahan, Curfews Free Juveniles, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 1996, at A21.
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The Black church today is the central institution in many urban
minority neighborhoods. 86 Even the poorest minority neighborhoods
have church participation rates that rival the average levels in wealthier city communities. 87 Like the church, the police are another stable
presence in the community. Unlike the church, the police do not enjoy a broad base of support in many high crime communities. Given
their similar missions, there would seem to be a natural affinity between the church and police in high-crime neighborhoods. However,
in many urban, minority neighborhoods, the institutional leaders of
the predominantly Black churches have virtually no contact at all with
the police. The historical role that the church has played in criticizing
police for abusive behavior and for non-responsiveness to citizens is
one reason for the nonexistent relationship between the two institutions. The church's special role in criticizing police makes it difficult
for church leaders to act as trust intermediaries between law enforcement agents and church members. The church leaders' reluctance (or
refusal) to "vouch" for police sustains an institutional resource mismatch in urban communities.
Can the police and the Black church work together in a way that
enhances social organization in the inner city? Such an alliance is being constructed in a Chicago neighborhood that consistently posts the
city's highest crime rates. The commander of the high crime Harrison
Police district brought together over 300 churches and lead approximately 8,000 community residents in a thirty-minute prayer vigil. In
groups of ten, the participants stood on designated corners-the same
corners where lookouts often hawked their wares by calling out
"Rocks and Blows!"-and prayed and sang and talked to each other.
Following the prayer vigil, the whole group retired to a large park
where there was music, food, and inspirational speeches. 88
86. Cf. C. ERIC LINCOLN & LAWRENCE H. MAMIYA, THE BLACK CHURCH IN THE AFRICAN
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 154 (1990) (describing urban Black churches' increasing involvement in
government programs).
87. According to a snrvey conducted by the Metro Chicago Information Center ("MCIC"),
a research organization studying non-profit community organizations, 62% of survey participants residing in the poor West Side communities of Humboldt Park, West Garfield, East Garfield, and North Lawndale donated money to churches and other religious organizations. In
contrast, 60% of survey participants living in the more wealthy North Side communities of Lincoln Park and Lake View, and 66% of participants citywide made similar contributions. See
MCIC Home Page (updated May 27, 1997) <http://www.mcic.org/commfacts/dsurvey.html>.
88. See Gary Marx, Cop Believes West Side Has A Prayer: Harrison Commander Uniting
Thousands For Vigil Against Violence, CHI. TRw., Chicagoland Section, May 2, 1997, at 1, and
Dave Newbart, Residents Take Faith To Streets For Vigil: ParticipantsPray For West Side Peace,

CHI. TRw., Chicagoland Section, May 4, 1997, at 1, for media accounts of the event.
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According to conversations I had with several people involved
with the prayer vigil, more than a few of the city officials involved
were uncomfortable about the explicit association of religion with policing activity. 89 But attention to norms suggests that such an assessment is misguided. One likely consequence of the prayer vigil was
that the behavior of the law-abiding residents of the high crime community was altered in a way that will improve the community's social
organization.
First, a relationship between the police and the institutional leaders of many churches was established in a community where the only

two stable institutions had little to do with one another. Now church
leaders are excited about their new connections with police. These
connections will produce social capital that the police and the church
can direct toward violence control: the police will now have access to

more information that will assist them in investigations, 90 and the
church leaders will be assured of greater police responsiveness to

criminal behavior affecting their parishioners. Second, individual
churches are working together in ways that they did not before. It
appears that the involvement of the state solved collective action
problems that prevented churches (especially churches of different denominations) from working together to enhance community efficacy.
This kind of institutional integration between the church and the
police and among the churches has and will continue to produce many
benefits for the individual members of these organizations. It is likely
that the relationships that residents have with each other will be

strengthened. Vigil participants came from many different community
churches. The commander's requirement that each corner post at
least ten individuals maximized the opportunities for the members of
89. Some may resist the notion of police-sponsored prayer vigil on constitutional grounds.
Cf Voswinkel v. City of Charlotte, 495 F. Supp. 588 (W.D.N.C 1980) (holding unconstitutional
an agreement between city and church providing that the church would furnish city with services
of minister to serve as "full-time" police chaplain); Warner v. Orange County Dep't of Probation, 827 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (ruling that plaintiff motorist stated a cause of action for a
violation of federal civil rights because probation condition required him to attend Alcohol
Anonymous meetings). While it certainly is possible to imagine aspects of a police-sponsored
prayer vigil that would be unconstitutional (for example, requiring police officers to attend and
participate), designating every police-initiated prayer vigil unconstitutional clearly would be an
unjustifiable instance of civil liberties fanaticism. See generally Meares & Kahan, supra note 78.
90. In fact, the value of information flow between church leaders and police is not confined
to information about criminal incidents. For example, at a follow-up meeting that occurred three
weeks after the prayer vigil, the Eleventh District's Commander insured that Police Ambassadors (officers who recruit for the Chicago Police), attended the meeting to distribute information
about police qualification exams and applications to ministers. Importantly, the ministers were
asked to do more than simply pass on the information to their parishioners. They were asked to
function as gatekeepers to insure that the applicants would be good police officers.
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various churches to meet each other. Because one aim of the vigil was
to increase the participation of neighborhood residents in community
policing programming, the vigil format facilitated the creation of an
additional context in which neighborhood residents would be exposed
to each other. This is an important point. When people interact with
each other in multiple contexts, there are multiple opportunities for
transmission of law-abiding norms. 91
Evaluation of this ground-breaking program is ongoing. 92 Nevertheless, the role of social organization in nourishing community's own
self-policing capacity suggests that the Harrison District's prayer vigil
has the potential to be an important tool of crime reduction. What
should be very clear, though, is that the social organization view of
law enforcement, by embracing even prayer, goes well beyond retooling law enforcement to transformationof it.
V.

CONCLUSION

Law enforcement is a critical part of a program to enhance social
organization in inner city communities plagued by crime. Law and
Order Cheerleaders get it half right by emphasizing the importance of
the government's role in maintaining law enforcement. Cheerleaders
are wrong, however, to tout the benefits for inner city communities of
color of a crime control program based primarily on deterring individual offenders through the elevating sentences (especially sentences for
non-violent offenders) and applying these sentences to greater numbers of people. The Cheerleaders' conception of law enforcement is
too cramped. Cheerleaders overlook the potential for the programs
they push to undermine the community-level social processes in inner
city neighborhoods that generate and transmit norms of law-abiding
behavior. We need much less of the law and order enforcement
program.
Law Enforcement Skeptics will agree with my last statement, but
they, too, get it only half right. While Skeptics support restricting the
91. See Marvin D. Krohn, The Web of Conformity: A Network Approach to the Explanation
of Delinquent Behavior, 33 Soc. PROBS. S81, S83 (1986) (calling this process "multiplexity" and
explaining it this way: "if a person interacts with the same people in differing social contexts it is
likely that his behavior in one context will be affected by his behavior in another.").
92. My research analyzing the impact of the prayer vigil on Chicago's West Side communities indicates that church leaders are paying attention to the number of young men who join the
church as a result of the vigil. There is some empirical research indicating a connection between
church participation by young Black men and crime reduction. See Richard B. Freeman, Who
Escapes? The Relation of Churchgoing and Other Background Factorsto the Socioeconomic Performance of Male Youths from Inner-City Tracts, in THE BLACK YoUtrr

353-376 (Richard B. Freeman and Henry J. Holzer eds., 1986)
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application of law enforcement by race, they offer no alternative vision of law enforcement that will be helpful to inner city communities
battling high crime levels. Instead Skeptics advocate redistributing
the "benefit" of law enforcement withdrawal by race. The Skeptics,
like the Cheerleaders, possess a conception of law enforcement policy
that is too cramped. Skeptics overlook the potential benefit that a law
enforcement with social organization improvement in mind can have
for communities of color.
Law enforcement is necessary for the social organization improvement project, but law enforcement as usual is not. Our goal,
instead, should be a law enforcement policy that is freed from the limited vision of producing deterrence through formal sanction while embracing the power of law-abiding residents of inner city communities
to effect private social control.

